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DO names really "open" us to an intersubjective ground, or are they simply so many ruins 
which designate a history irrevocably lost? Do these names really signify for us the fullness 
of the lives that were lost, or are they so many tokens of what we cannot know, enigmas, 
inscwtable and silent? 
- Judith Butler 
Questions of mimesis, strategies of empathy, the truth in fiction, the fiction in truth and 
the tension between literalness and metaphor are always at work in documentary photo- 
graphic representation; these factors are all the more germane and strained in contemporary 
photographic re-presentations of Holocaust memory and history. The contemporary liter- 
ature addressing problems in the documentary tradition and documentary's attempt to 
represent difficult and extreme material is resoundingly absent on the subject of Holocaust 
representation. What the literature highlights, however, is that documentary is never a 
transparent claim to truth despite its attempt to set up a universalized one-point perspec- 
tive.' To call photographs depicting events, moments and lives ruined by Nazi crimes 
in the Holocaust "documentary" is a misnomer of catastrophic proportions. Indeed, 
Holocaust-related photography is capable of revealing the insidious fictions of documen- 
tary's supposedly factual representation. For example, the notion that a documentary pho- 
tograph involves a transactional exchange between the subject and the photographer 
is rendered ludicrous in the shadow of the experiences of the millions who suffered from 
unimaginable pain and loss and who had no choice about their "participation" in the pho- 
tographic event. I t  is crucial to remember that the individuals who have become the sub- 
jects and objects of Holocaust photographs were not accessible to the purview of just any 
errant, socially concerned eye. The ghettos and camps were strictly closed off to the outside 
world. As a result, the precious and troubling photographs that remain are double- 
edged; although they offer rare views inside the ghettos and camps they were, neverthe- 
less, staged by the Nazis. These photographs were orchestrated to veil the mechanisms 
of the "Final Solution" and were targeted to the (largely unconcerned) free world to 
project the lie that the Jews, Catholics, Communists, Gypsies, homosexuals, mentally- 
retarded and other Nazi victims were safe, and even gainfully employed.2 The other 
group of institutionally produced photographs contemporaneous with the events were 
those taken by the Allies at the end of the war, predominately by the United States 
military photographers during the liberation of the camps. They, too, are burdened with 
their own propaganda motives.3 
The multiple inflections of Holocaust-related documentary photographs are orches- 
trated on less propagandistic stages as well. Their less explicit manoeuvres - those that 
have nothing to do with intentional distortions and lies - are lodged in photography's 
oscillating realism: its double-edged capacity holding forth the promise of honoring while 
marking and fixing its subject. In the very moment of its giving name and face to a previ- 
ously undocumented or undisclosed reality, photographic nomenclature also works to 
stigmatize and hold at bay the subjectlobject of its view. Indeed, if too much horror is 
shown in the presentation of Holocaust-related photographs, the desired retrospective 
bond between viewer and pictured can turn into codified positions of the pathetic and 
the privileged. Often, the debilitating grimness of the scene blinds the viewer entirely 
or turns him or her retrospectively against the pictured, with troubling ramifications in 
the present tense. Elie Wiesel has put the dilemma in literal and metaphorical terms: "I 
would bring the viewer closer to the gate but not inside, because he can't go inside, but 
that's close enough."4 
Walter Benjamin's extremely fruitful insight about the uncanny distance and proxim- 
ity rendered by photography pinpoints the cruel paradox of its inscription process.> The 
uncertain spatio-temporal status of photography parallels the oscillation of names, which 
do not go far enough yet are always in excess. Benjamin referred to this impenetrable dis- 
tance between signifier and signified as overnaming {UberbenennzlngJ6 and suggested that 
the processes of naming and mourning are linked: "To be named - even when the namer 
is Godlike and blissful -perhaps always remains an intimation of mourning."7 As Roland 
Barthes construed it, and one of the early functions of photography as the appropriate 
memento mori souvenir would confirm it, the photograph as the frozen trace of life would 
seem to be the fitting lifeldeath artifact of mourning.8 Yet conflating photography with 
death and mourning is rendered ludicrous in the context of the Holocaust, when both the 
site of the photograph and the ability to contain a natural death are but shadows of an 
irretrievable past life.9 
In its most revelatory sense, the documentary photograph is an artifact that issues a 
warning: what it appears to represent is only one surface element in a deeper and more 
complex structure of meaning. (In fact, the earliest usages of the word "document" point 
to its ability to teach and to warn.) Thus the photographic document should not be 
restricted to freezing the reality it indexes and numbing us from it. The cruel and poignant 
paradox of the photograph is situated precisely in history's demand that it also function as 
an empathic marker; yet if empathy is taken to mean the imaginative projection of one's 
own consciousness into another being's, this empathic merging becomes merely impossi- 
ble when the events are so unimaginable that they overwhelm the mind's ability to find 
a place where their representation can be lodged. Immanuel Kant's theory of the sublime 
offers a model for the acute difference between the enormity of a concept and the imagi- 
nation's inability to present the totality of that idea. The incommensurability of the 
events of the Holocaust suggests the intangible reality of Kant's impossible reciprocities. 
Indeed, as Saul Friedlander urgently phrased it, we need to envision a new category of 
the sublime as it relates to representation of the Holocaust "specifically meant to capture 
inexpressible horror."lO 
Jean-Franqois Lyotard takes up precisely Kant's insistence on negative presentation - in 
which presentation exists to point to the reality of its ~npresentabi l i t~ - in his attempt to 
phrase out a space for the (im)possible and pressing demand to find appropriate recognition 
and representation in the context of, as he puts it, "phrasing, after Auschwitz." In spite 
of the obscenity of linkages of what Lyotard terms "phrase regimes," he acknowledges the 
vital need for different linkages, different justices. His formulation of these possible jus- 
tices is performed in the name of heterogenous incommensurabilities. In his book The 
Differend,ll Lyotard's attack on the rationalist logic that embodies Western philosophy 
takes on a more specific motive than in previous work: to undercut the revisionist assaults 
made by so-called historians, most notoriously Robert Faurisson, who claim that the man- 
made mass murders that are the Holocaust never occurred because the revisionists cannot 
find a single witness to the gas chambers. The perverse logic that makes those witnesses 
unavailable is of course that these victims/witnesses are all dead. I t  is this kind of logic, 
pushed to its ludicrous and obscene limits, that Lyotard wants to discredit. For Lyotard, 
the "differend," the key word and underlying concept guiding his book of the same name, 
goes further than its simple translation into English as a difference, a dispute, or a disagree- 
ment - although it encompasses all of these meanings. He uses it strategically to refer to 
legal procedures with their game of logical arguments and eitherlor modes of operation, 
modes based on the totality of restrictive thinking which Lyotard targets at  the  heart of 
his work. As he writes of the revisionists' procedures: 
The "revisionist" historians understand as applicable to this name [Auschwitz) only the cogni- 
tive rules for the establishment of historical reality and for the validation of its sense. If justice 
consisted solely in respecting these rules, and if history gave rise only to historical inquiry, they 
could not be accused of a denial of justice. In fact, they administer a justice in conformity with 
the rules and exert a positively instituted right.12 
With  the extreme case of Auschwitz and the real spectre of revisionist historians in 
mind, Lyotard asks that if a wrong cannot be admitted into court because it cannot be 
phrased, cannot be proved, "should the victim seek to  bypass this impossibility and testify 
anyway to the wrong done to  him or to  he r . .  . . " l3  Lyotard seeks to move his case out of 
the dialectical logic of the courtoom, distinguishing a differend from a litigation on several 
grounds: among them, the former cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judge- 
ment applicable to both arguments, and a universal rule of judgement between heteroge- 
nous genres is lacking in general. The only non-illusory object for Lyotard is the  phrase. 
And in his own dialectical mode, Lyotard explicitly and implicitly harbors a crucial point: 
the non-phrase which is silence is a resounding sentence. In  the face of the revisionists' 
self-proclaimed victory based on the materiality of supposedly factual evidence rendered 
through the most tortuous of means, Lyotard counters not with hard facts but, significantly, 
with the reality of the referent through its very immateriality, its immeasurability. Hence, 
his ~ o w e r f u l  metaphor of the earthquake: 
But the silence imposed on knowledge does not impose the silence of forgetting, it imposes a 
feeling (No. 22). Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects 
but also the instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The impossibil- 
ity of quantitatively measuring it does not prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the 
survivors the idea of a very great seismic force. The scholar claims to know nothing about it, 
but the common person has a complex feeling, the one aroused by the negative presentation 
of the indeterminate. Matatis matandis, the silence that the crime of Auschwitz imposes upon 
the historian is a sign for the common person. Signs (Kant Notices 3 and 4) are not referents 
to which are attached significations validatable under the cognitive regimen, they indicate 
that something which should be able to be put into phrases cannot be phrased in the accepted 
idioms (No. 23). . . . This sign affects a linking of phrases. The indetermination of meanings 
left in abeyance [en soaff~ance], the extermination of what would allow them to be determined, 
the shadow of negation hollowing out reality to the point of making it dissipate, in a word, 
the wrong done to the victims condemns them to silence - it is this, and not a state of mind, 
which calls upon unknown phrases to link onto the name of Auschwitz.'4 
Through his elaboration of Kant's signs of history, Lyotard is not calling for a dispersal 
of sense nor a denial of language's ability to formulate linguistic communication. In rely- 
ing on the idea of the differend he is, in fact, formulating a figure that will negotiate the 
breakdown of linkages between event and non-event. As he explains this new elucidation, 
To give the differend its due is to institute new addressees, new addressors, new significations, 
and new referents in order for the wrong to find an expression and for theplaintiffto cease being a 
victim. This requires new rules for the formation and linking of phrases. No one doubts that lan- 
guage is capable of admitting these new phrase families or new genres of discourse. Every wrong 
ought to be able to be put into phrases. A new competence (or "prudence") must be found. . . . 
What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to dif- 
ferends by finding idioms for them.15 
The differend itself is the idea of a presentation of the sublime and a bearing witness 
for which it is nearly impossible to find expression. Rather than attempting to find a nor- 
mative code of representation, Lyotard is attentive to Kant's notion of "feeling." If history 
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renders facts, then the spaces between what cannot be documented or what has been oblit- 
erated renders feelings for what cannot be recalled as facts. The silences that are resonant 
signs of history demand phrasing and representation. Indeed, Lyotard creates a call "to 
bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them." What  is at  stake is precisely what 
kinds of idioms can be presented in the name of bearing witness. 
The photograph has been made to assume the uneasy burden of bearing witness to the 
events. Holocaust-related photographs have been and continue to be employed to foster 
the precious if not irresolvable mandate "never forget." If the photograph performs the 
overdetermined role of mirror and window onto the unimaginable reality, if it stands in as 
part of the incommensurable and impossible entirety, the problems are compounded for 
the museum attempting to stage remembrance of an historically sublime event. Caught 
between performing as history lessons and providing sites for mourning, the Holocaust 
memorial museum's doubled, daunting and riddled mandate parallels the burden assigned 
to the photograph. The work of the museum condenses life time into historical time 
and vice versa, as does the still photograph. Bringing the photograph as historical marker 
and as monument into the museum recalls Adorno's likening the museum to the mau- 
soleum.16 When the web of issues confronting photography are conflated with those of 
the museum in bearing witness to the sublime in framing and strategically re-staging 
mass death and the Holocaust, the crucial problems and sharp poignancies of historicizing 
and memorializing are brought to the surface. At stake is the delicate question of simulat- 
ing history through photography and the formation of participants and spectators in this 
process. A complex of questions thus arises: Can the photographs reside in the archive as 
objective historical documents and simultaneously work as empathic markers in exhibition 
spaces? Must not the stringent requirements of historical objectivity and photographic 
categorization be partially waived to reshape these documents into other, less defined dis- 
courses? Does not the extreme, urgent, complex, vivid and obscure subject of Holocaust 
memory itself demand such loosenings of bureaucratized divisions? 
In the grey zones between elaborate, meticulous historical reconstruction that is the 
domain of the museum and the perhaps not so antithetical positions of fictional re-creation 
usually staked out by artistic, literary and filmic representations, the trauma of the expe- 
riences and the trauma that is the photograph both signal warnings. The photograph is 
only a trace of the trauma of the Holocaust; it is precisely in its critical trace that it should 
not be vainly employed to reconstruct an impossible totality. Neither, however, should the 
photographic artifact be revoked. If the image cannot tell the "full" story, it can be 
retrieved to work as a trace of both lived and projected post-memory. That is, remembrance 
as a form of retrospective and contemporary alterity, an otherness that bespeaks respectful 
distance yet partial palpability. The fragile possibilities and the poignant risks facing the 
transformation of Holocaust-related photographs - both as dramatized artifacts and in 
mediation with other artifacts through exhibition techniques - reside in the museum's 
ability to restage history not as a comprehensible totality, but as a process, as a pathway 
toward keeping the memory and the trauma at once approachable and unassailable.17 
Upon entrance to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., 
the visitor is "invited to register" for an identity card.18 The visitor enters her or his age 
and gender into a computer placed in the foyer of the paradoxically vast and claustropho- 
bic space of the Hall of Witness. The computer will then process the museum visitor's 
data in order to issue him or her an identity card representing a Holocaust victim whose 
bare traces of identity are approximately matched to the visitor's statistics. The cover of 
the identity card bears the logo and the organizing authoritative logic of the museum's 
symbolic imprint. In this guise, the name of the museum appears in full below the eagle 
crowned with the logos: "For the dead and the living we must bear witness."l9 Each iden- 
tity card is also marked with a four-digit number, computer printed as if it were freshly 
stamped. Opening the identity card and reading the inside front page reveals the vital 
statistics of the person who experienced the Holocaust: name, date of birth, place of birth 
and place of residence. Printed directly above this data looms a close-up black-and-white 
pre-Holocaust photograph of the personlsubject in question. The visitor journeys through 
the permanent exhibition with this eerie conflation of passport and life sentence in hand. 
At the end of each floor of the permanent exhibition, the visitor is again invited to enter the 
identity card into a computer in order to obtain further information about their extended 
double. The documentation added at each computer station correlates with the years chron- 
icled by the exhibition. The permanent exhibition is divided into chronological sections: 
making up the fourth floor, where the exhibition begins, is The Assault 1933-1939; on 
the third floor is The Holocaust 1940-1944; and the second floor lays claim to Beating 
Witness 1945-. The identity card's unfolding biographical narrative both parallels and 
intervenes in the larger historical narrative being produced in the massive 40,000 square- 
foot permanent exhibition. By the time the visitor has descended the exhibition's floors, 
his or her card will be filled with a condensed text revealing whether or not their ghost- 
guide survived the atrocities. 
I t  is more than coincident that  this punctuated facsimile marking the bare minimum 
of a Holocaust victim's pre-Holocaust life and the unfolding ruin of his or her existence 
afterward echoes the horror of the actual marking process. The metaphors to  the brutal 
labelling are hardly masked. Indeed, the philosophy driving the strategies of the museum's 
permanent exhibition program is based on bringing the horrors close to the surface, refus- 
ing to "sanitize" them. The museum's guiding approach was largely formulated by Martin 
Smith, former director of the museum's permanent exhibition program. Significant to the 
profile of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Smith is not a museum profes- 
sional. H e  was chosen to formulate the museum's theoretical underpinnings and their expo- 
sition in the permanent exhibition precisely because of his experience as an independent 
documentary filmmaker.20 Given museum director Jeshajahu Weinberg's hopes for the 
museum, to "introduce a three-dimensional multi-media approach" that  he wants to dif- 
ferentiate from the more traditional ways of telling Holocaust history, Smith's past work 
with photographs and film footage as documents and storytelling devices harmonized well 
with the museum's goals.21 Smith reflected on his working philosophy as it guided the 
difficult and daunting task toward formulating the permanent exhibition a t  the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum: 
That any individual who wasn't part of the event can comprehend the event seems to me beyond 
the realm of reason. Even the survivors themselves cannot comprehend the event. They can 
perhaps occasionally comprehend the part and parcel of i t . .  . . I think we cannot avoid looking 
at some of the worst of the material. But what is the worst anyway? I find just looking at peo- 
ple's heads and feet when they are deceased as distasteful as anything else, like pubic hair and 
everything else that has caused me any number of worries. My belief is that if you do not put 
them on display then you are diminishing the extent of the horror and what the experience 
actually meant.. . . The irony is that I don't trust the medium of documentary photography at 
all and I don't even trust historical records. They are all coming through the filter system of 
human memory and all memory is written to advance a particular point of view. I do, however, 
think that the only way to handle the event is via a documentary approach. But I don't believe 
either documentary films or photographs alone can do it. The exhibit will be a mixture of pho- 
tographs, films, documents and artifacts. I think increasingly with time people will be more and 
more skeptical about visual imagery and about film and rightly so. .  . . The difference between 
our museum and most museums is that the photograph as object is of very little interest to 
us as far as the permanent exhibit is concerned. We are using photographs as evidentiary and 
storytelling vehicles. . . .22 
The museum's unflinching approach is made literally tangible from the  first steps the 
visitor takes into this mammoth edifice of simulated memory. The visitor enters the 
museum's permanent exhibition via one of three thin grey elevators. Once the elevator 
door shuts the viewer focuses on film footage enacting the liberation of the camps which 
is screened above them.23 After the approximately twenty second journey ends, the eleva- 
tor opens onto a view that confronts a black and white photographic blow-up depicting 
American soldiers at the Ohrdarf extermination camp at the time of liberation. A smaller 
colour photograph of a man who survived Buchenwald also immediately introduces the 
viewer to the exhibition. 
The vital question thus brings its own pressure to bear on what remains to be told, 
toward what can be told. What forms of photographic nomenclature can be presented in 
the name of bearing witness? The Lyotardian echo reverberates "to bear witness to differ- 
ends by finding idioms for them." The most troubling issues for Smith at the United States 
fiolocaust Memorial Museum were precisely those bearing on the near-impossibility 
of confronting Holocaust memory and history on its palimpsest of levels, accepting the 
responsibility of "telling the story" and the difficult indispensability of employing docu- 
mentary photographs. What then are the museum's divided and perhaps converging 
strategies for telling history and the modes of address it constructs between the visitor 
and the material? 
Held carefully between the visitor's fingers or nestled nonchalantly in a coat pocket, 
the identity card might hold out the possibility of working across the relentlessly graphic 
and chronologically linear view of history projected throughout the elaborately-storied 
exhibition. Indeed, the exhibition team devised the identity card project as a way to break 
down the history of the Holocaust into what they refer to as human terms. Speaking about 
the majority of photographic images picturing people as ghost fagades of their former 
selves, such as those that arrest the visitor upon his or her entrance into the museum, Smith 
rhetorically asks, "Why would a robust, McDonalds-fed, 18-year-old American boy have 
any connection to these emaciated figures? The identity card project came out of our desire 
to establish an immediate bonding with a person and a place."24 
The notion of bonding is indeed key to the tantalizing concept underlying the identity 
card project. At stake is precisely how the texture of this bonding between the contem- 
porary museum viewer and his or her extended double from the grave past will be staged. 
Also crucially at issue are how the photographic and textual markers that represent the 
Holocaust victim will formulate the proximities and the distances between that absent 
person and the variable identities of the museum visitor(s). In other words, how will the 
normative positions of objectivity (the museum visitor's) and subjectivity (that of the 
"object" viewed) be maintained, refracted or abridged? If it is the museum's goal that the 
visitor arrive at some form of empathy toward the human spectre that has guided them 
through and across the permanent exhibition, it relies heavily on the possibility of imagi- 
native projection. First, to write the shadow of a Holocaust victim's experiences through 
the inscription of a single photograph and an attentuated text calls forth its very (im)pos- 
sibility. Further, to write and to re-envision across the chasm of unimaginable realities and 
incommensurable events and to bring in another's ability to imagine, to be open to the 
Holocaust other, is a necessary presumption. The identity card project tantalizes precisely 
because it acknowledges the presence of a viewer who receives information on cognitive 
and emotional registers. Through its functional and participatory processes, the identity 
card project provokes the possibility of intervening in documentary presentations which 
presume that looking is based on purely objective dynamics. 
Despite the museum's self-congratulatory rhetoric that it will "tell the full st0ry,"~5 the 
actual thinking toward the identity card is more closely aligned with Elie Wiesel's notion, 
mentioned earlier, of a metaphorical and literal gate or a barrier to full knowledge. Irving 
Howe has also written against the possibility of full disclosure and has called for repre- 
sentations that work in "tentative and modest solidarity with those who fell."*6 The 
refusal or the inability to grant full disclosure to historical events correlates with the dis- 
closed and proper inability to create perfect mergings between the museum spectator and 
images of Holocaust victims. In fact, it is the identity card project's very reliance on the 
museum visitor's subjectivity and self-investment - the skeletal allowance of his or her 
own biographical data that drives the issuance of the card - that mimics the notion of a 
perfect mirror staging. An extreme and yet probable case of a shattering of, rather than a 
conflation with, one's doubled persona could occur if the visitor refuses affinity with their 
issued ghost. Smith has given thought to these built-in confrontations: 
Somebody may be offended by having their personal identity card represent a homosexual, to 
which my response is, if a Fundamentalist Christian comes in, would he be satisfied being cou- 
pled with a Jew? So if you don't issue a Jew, where do you go? Are we going to allow a Jew to 
say, "No, I don't want to hear about some dissenting Chri~tian"?~'  
Although such surface disjunctures are built into the manoeuvring of the identity card, 
it is more conceptually driven by attempts to formulate imaginative projection tending 
toward empathy. What  then are its safeguards, its soft barriers that warn against facile 
bonds of sameness between the museum visitor and the persons pictured and described on 
the cards? This crucial question might itself assume too much, might retrospectively be 
in vain because a marking of differences is always already in place in the strange and unpre- 
dictable CO-mingling of identities attenuated by the identity card. No matter what is 
announced about the project's ability to pair and to compare, the workings of the identity 
card could never occur through seamless identifications. Everywhere in the museum - from 
the vague memory of the disembodied city outside, which the museum's architecture tries 
to efface, to the intricate workings of the simulated environments it houses - we are 
reminded that we are in a vast space of articulated re-creation. To thus create a fusion of 
identities without gaps between the museum visitor and the remembered Holocaust vic- 
tims would verge on the dangerous as well as the inconceivable. 
I t  is the photographed face of the Holocaust victim that paradoxically promises to 
ward off slipping into false realisms and facile mimetic mergings endemic to the estranged 
documentary tradition. The photograph of the face on the identity card functions as an 
arbiter or a boundary zone between the interchangeable subjective and objective identities 
of the viewer and the memorialized other. It also negotiates the disputed terrain between 
the remembered and recountable historicized past of the individual to be thus commemo- 
rated and the private space of his or her unknowable and unrecountable life. In its pro- 
found visibility and simultaneous elusiveness, the hovering small-scale photographic face 
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is a trace indexing parts of a map to a larger history. The oscillations of the face and the 
photograph as both presence and absence mirror the tensions in the photographic repre- 
sentation of intractable events. The employment of the face on the identity cards suggests 
a point of arrest bridging the utter horror depicted through the mass of Holocaust-related 
documentary photographs and the sheer refusal to depict. It serves as a vital buffer across 
the unpresentable and a tentative temptation to represent. I t  is fitting that the image of 
the face returns in an orchestrated manoeuvre meant to bracket the Nazi's mass-scale elimi- 
nation and extermination of bodies, faces and identities. The photographic act of giving 
back faces and names and the textual performance of re-identifying appropriately take 
place here through dialectic means. The identity card conflates and restages the Nazi's 
perverse criminalizing of innocent persons while it seeks to enact recuperative acts of 
commemoration. Yet the restoration of the identity and the personhood of the individuals 
who perished or who suffered immeasurably is only provisionally accomplished by the 
degree to which the unknown museum visitor can or will internalize these memorized 
histories. 
The uneasy point of intersection between the past and the present in the identity 
card's construction of historical memory is further played out through the confusion of 
tenses written into its condensed biographical sketches. The identity card documenting 
the unfolding of Haskel Kernweis' fatal entanglement with the Nazis moves between 
the present and past tenses. The text that introduces Haskel with his photograph and 
bare data of existence reads: 
Haskel comes from a small village in Galicia. His family is very religious. His mother raises 
geese, chickens, and vegetables for the family to eat. Haskel walks 5 miles to public school 
in the morning, and goes to religious school in the afternoon. 
Having established a trace of Haskel's pre-Holocaust existence, the text is brought 
consecutively into focus as the visitor moves through the floors of the exhibition space: 
1933-1939: Haskel now calls himself "Charley," for his passion is no longer religion but 
English. He spends much of his time learning English from a torn, old grammar book. He 
writes to Eleanor Roosevelt telling her that he loves English and wants to speak it in America 
one day. She responds enthusiastically. The German police order Charley to work for them. 
1940-1944: Charley is told by the Germans to dismantle the ghetto in Kolbushova, then hears 
that he is to be killed upon completion of the job. He escapes into the woods with a group 
of Jewish men. 
The present tense is unfortunate here for it works too hard and in vain to force the 
reality of Haskel into our present. The entire machinery of memory being so carefully con- 
structed at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is supposedly being performed 
so that the memory of the past will be reformulated in the present. To pretend that the 
brutal and complete past can be written in the form of an innocent, innocuous and inti- 
mate present verges on the absurd, without pushing it far enough for us to pause on the 
incongruity of the task. It  is hardly fitting to the memory of the person Haskel, whom we 
will never know. 
The past tense enters this historico-diaristic narrative indicator at the terse point 
where the text intimates Haskel's death, in the middle of the 1940-1944 section: "One 
day, Charley went into a town to buy bread. Waiting for him were a group of Polish peas- 
ants . . . . " And it then continues, more aligned to the narrative and more in justice to 
Haskel's memory, in the simple past: "His friends found him - dead, a pitchfork stuck into 
his chest. 1945: Charley's entire family was gassed at Belzec. Only one of the Jewish fight- 
ers who went to the woods with him survived the war." 
The identity card project intrigues precisely because it brings photographically and 
textually into view realities that will always be out of reach. The presumptuous con- 
tention at work is that the identity card's strategy of bonding can, indeed, write across 
chasms of the unknowable to arrive at some point of provisional fusion. The identity card 
experiment suggests one way to approach the inevitable dilemma of representing the 
unrepresentable, but in its move toward intimacy it more deeply reinforces the abyss of 
distance it so emphatically seeks to shore up. This reaching across to the unknowable rep- 
resents a desire to render present that which is not presentable but which can never be 
completely absent. This poignant and haunting desire to seek idioms for the horrible sub- 
lime which gives life to the identity card project bears in it the oscillating drives animat- 
ing the dialectic dynamics of mourning itself. 
Mourning may be thought to occur in less clearly defined and more overlapping terms 
than those put forward by Sigmund Freud, who figures it as an act which can be success- 
fully accomplished through the "economic" incorporation of the lost other into the self. 
In Jacques Derrida's crucial text on mourning, friendship and unreadability, MLmoiresfor 
P a d  de Man, he weaves a discussion of a transfigured narcissism in which the self comes 
to understand its imprecise proximities with the grieved other through the simultaneous 
processes of possible and impossible mourning: 
Memory and interiorization: since Freud, this is how the "normal" work of mourning is often 
described. It entails a movement in which an interiorizing idealization takes in itself or upon 
itself the body and voice of the other, the other's visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally 
devouring them. This mimetic interiorization is not fictive; it is the origin of fiction, of apoc- 
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ryphal figuration. It takes place in a body. Or rather, it makes a place for a body, a voice, and 
a soul which, although "ours," did not exist and had no meaning before this possibility that 
one must always begin by remembering, and whose trace must be followed. Z l  fazt, one must: 
it is the law, that law of the (necessary) relation of Being to law. We can only live this experi- 
ence in the form of an aporia: the aporia of mourning and of prosopopeia, where the possible 
remains impossible. Where saccess fails. And where faithful interiorization bears the other and 
constitutes him in me (in us), at once living and dead. It makes the other apart of us, between 
us - and then the other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we grieve for him and 
bear him in us, like an unborn child, like a future. And inversely, the failure szcceeds: an aborted 
interiorization is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, 
a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, 
outside of  US.^^ 
This eloquent articulation figures possible mourning as Freud's clinical description 
of incorporation; impossible mourning would be the refusal to take the grieved other 
within onself so completely, so definitively. Derrida's idea of tender rejection acknowledges 
the self's almost obscene capacity to overwhelm the other, over there in his or her death. 
However, the incorporation of the other and its tender rejection are far from being mutu- 
ally exclusive. Derrida reinvestigates their processes as being intricately intertwined. He 
discusses possible and impossible mourning in a CO-mingling of more clinically derived 
psychoanalytic and poetic terms in his earlier text, "Fors," the foreword to The WolfMan's 
Magic Word: A Cryptonymy, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok's study: "Introjection/ 
incorporation: Everything is played out on the borderline that divides and opposes the 
two terms. From one safe, the other; from one inside, the other; one within the other; and 
the same outside the other."*9 Introjection is that move that tries (in vain) to suppress the 
interiorizing act of incorporation. Another quote is important here to establish the inter- 
connecting modes of mourning: 
The question could of course be raised as to whether or not "normal" mourning preserves the 
object as other (a living person dead) inside me. This question - of the general appropriation and 
safekeeping of the other as other - can always be raised as the deciding factor, but does it not at 
the same time blur the very line it draws between introjection and incorporation, through an 
essential and irreducible ambiguity? Let us give this question a chance to be reposed. For Maria 
Torok, "incorporation, properly speaking," in its "rightful semantic specificity," intervenes at 
the limits of introjection itself, when introjection, for some reason, fails. Faced with the impo- 
tence of the process of introjection (gradual, slow, laborious, mediated, effective), incorporation 
is the only choice: fantasmatic, unmediated, instantaneous, magical, sometimes hallucinatory.30 
The instantaneous and fantasmatic longing that enacts the mourning of incorporation 
takes us back to the United States Memorial Museum and Martin Smith's desires for the 
identity card project: "to establish an immediate bonding with a person and a place." That 
the museum has opted for the abbreviated version of mourning, the one that Derrida iron- 
ically yet gravely notes, from Maria Torok's description, as "the only choice," may well 
be because the museum has no other choice in hoping that casual visitors - tourists that 
is - would quickly come to some point of empathy with and historical recognition of the 
myriad experiences of Holocaust victims. The notion of mourning as a process of incorpo- 
ration is closely enmeshed with the longing toward figurative bonding that the identity 
card project hopes to attain. Incorporation and the identity card project conjoin specifically 
in the dilemma of the place of the other. Where is the place of the departed other and where 
is he or she simultaneously displaced through the processes of incorporation set into motion 
through the identity card? The identity card pleads for instantaneous, immediate and yet 
impossible bonding. I t  bears in it the haunted oscillations between loving proximity and 
irrevocable distance toward the other. As Maria Torok has aptly phrased it, "The more the 
self keeps the foreign element as a foreigner inside itself, the more it excludes it. The self 
mimes introjection."31 The question arises as to whether the imaginative projection of liv- 
ing in the name and in the place of the Holocaust other allows for a respectful taking in or 
incorporation of his or her memory without the attendant miming of introjection. In the 
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the State Museum in 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
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enmeshed workings of incorporation and introjection, or possible and impossible mourn- 
ing, the safekeeping of the other must always simultaneously participate in its camouflaged 
exclusion, its tender rejection. 
The identity card certainly calls for a taking in of life within oneself through the abbre- 
viated notion of self-investment. The museum visitor indeed cloaks him or herself in the 
identity of the departed or brutalized other. But the intensity or degree of intake may not 
be sustained enough to prepare for the profitable return of introjection, for the ability to 
find a space of appropriate distance leading to respectful and inevitable otherness. 
Undercover in the identity card project rests a curious inversion of investments. So much is 
at stake in the museum visitor's investment to take in another that the identity and person- 
hood of the memorialized other risks being lost in the process. Indeed, the issuance of mock 
identity cards could turn out to be a mourning and a bearing witness turned inside out and 
strained at its seams. This strange fusion of selves represents a desire for urgency camou- 
flaged as a transfixed form of displaced nostalgia. The United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum's attempt at empathy might better function as a reminder that the few circulating 
photographs documenting the Nazi ruin of the lives of the people pictured on the identity 
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cards did little to alert the Allies or to bring them to action. Especially given the identity 
card's simulacrum of a United States' passport, we might then ask how the documentary 
photographs featuring American soldiers liberating the camps on display in the permanent 
exhibition can pretend to function as warning signals on the level of lucid historical objec- 
tivity. The current manipulation and presence of these 
images both re-animate and haunt their past lives. The 
photographs and the identity cards unintentionally yet 
translucently perform that lack of response as mute and 
potent witnesses. Thus in their tantalizing (im)possibility, 
the identity cards tear at the photographic wound that 
would make of memory a souvenir. 
While the museum travellers literally traverse and 
descend the three floors of the permanent exhibition with 
their expendable identity cards in hand, a different con- 
struction of photographic memory-work is being tried in 
an adjoining section of the exhibition space. Set off from 
the main arenas of chronological articulation and simula- 
tion are four tower alcoves filled with intimate possessions 
of those who perished and the instruments of their death. 
Right: Tower of Faces, 
United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum. 
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What promises to be the most expansive of these meta-exhibitions is the Tower of Faces, a 
space which is covered from top to bottom with 1,032 photographs of former residents of 
the Lithuanian town of Ejszyszki taken between 1890 and 1941. The 54-foot high, 16- 
foot by 28-foot sky-lit tower space was designed to stage a very specific approach for the 
museum visitor. Rather than being able to enter the alcove as if it were an easily accessible 
and perusable room, the fifth floor of the museum was removed at the point where it 
would connect with the tower's interior space. The visitor's journey through the Tower of 
Faces is thus possible only by crossing over a translucent glass bridge at the third and 
fourth floors. The photographs of the former townspeople of Ejszyszki are laminated over 
aluminum sheets and mounted on a lattice frame angling inward as it rises from its base on 
the third floor to its fifth floor ceiling. As the museum's newsletter describes the effect, 
"visitors will be able to peer over the side of the bridge and view the photographs from 
Ejszyszki seemingly floating above and cascading below them."32 
Unlike the identity card's mode of address based on insistent self-identifications, the 
Tower of Faces stages the spectator to occupy the role of near-invisibility. We are allowed 
to pass through the photographically haunting identities of the Jews from Ejszyszki; no 
virtual attempt will be made to psychically or historically bond us with them as their pre- 
Holocaust likenesses bring us near. Absent, too, from this mote gentle memory-trial is the 
strained anticipation and parcelated telling of the brutalities at work in the identity card 
project. The events that occurred at Ejszyszki are recounted after the visitor passes through 
the photographic chamber via the glass bridge for the first time. I t  is told how, during the 
period of the Jewish high holidays in 1941, from September 25 to 26, the Nazi mobile 
killing squads or Einsatzgruppen rounded up people from the synagogues, took them to the 
marketplace and then to the fields outside the town to be massacred. Throughout Europe 
and with the help of non-German collaborators, the Einsatzgruppen mass-murdered over 
two million Jews and still-unmeasured numbers of Gypsies, Byelorussians and Russians 
before the organized plan of the concentration and exterminations camps was in place. The 
visitor's second encounter with the photographic ghosts of the slaughtered Ejszyszkians, 
those few who survived and their ancestors occurs on the third floor of the museum, at 
which point he or she crosses the glass bridge yet another time. 
Although the Tower of Faces and the identity card project are both animated by ambiva- 
lent desires to intervene in a purely linear and chronological telling of the events of the 
Holocaust, the unravelling, or more precisely, the filling up of information on the identity 
card nonetheless progresses on a path parallel with the larger narrative. Because of the 
identity card's plea for assimilation of the Holocaust victim's history into our supposedly 

singular identities, the articulation of the past into the present and the desire to abridge 
the sense of pastness remains a story of easily separable spaces of time and memory. The 
visitor never returns to the same place and time again; history is told in a logically sequen- 
tial framework. Circulating on a different register in the Tower of Faces, the histories and 
identities of the town and the people of Ejszyszki are provocatively staged through repeti- 
tions of almost identical spaces that do not follow one after the other. The first tenuous 
crossing of the glass bridge is repeated on the next lower floor only after the museum visi- 
tor has undergone the full onslaught of the fourth and third floor exhibitions. The second 
entrance into the photographic tower allows for a second glimpse or a revision that func- 
tions more in harmony with the layered way in which memories overlap and cross the men- 
tal time zones of the past and the present, especially involving circumstances of extreme 
traumatic dislocation. In her book, A SC@ of Time, Polish Holocaust survivor Ida Fink 
writes about her own tenuous return to the remembrance of the unarticulated and immea- 
surable past: 
I want to talk about a certain time not measured in months and years. For so long I have 
wanted to talk about this time.. . . I wanted to, but I couldn't; I didn't know how. I was 
afraid, too, that this second time, which is measured in months and years, had buried the 
other time under a layer of years, that this second time had crushed the first and destroyed 
it within me. But no. Today, digging around in the ruins of memory, I found it fresh and 
untouched by forgetfulness. 33 
The dilemmas and the interweavings between chronologically measurable calendar time 
and the cyclical structure of repeatable time in nature and memory - a time which, how- 
ever, never returns as the same - is a constant joy and tension in Jewish tradition. The 
ability of the Tower of Faces to both evoke the "ruins of memory," as Ida Fink described 
her own internal journey, and to provoke historical remembrance so vividly through the 
resiliant re-visioned faces attests to a specific tradition of Holocaust remembrance related 
to the larger Jewish tradition that overlaps chronological time and cyclical space. Yisker 
biher, literally "tombstones of paper," refers to the religious and historical obligation to 
remember annihilated communities as well as the collective and individual memorial books 
themselves spontaneously produced by survivors who perform this work of remembrance. 
The first contemporary yisker biher were produced following the post-World War I pogroms 
in Central and Eastern Europe; and these memorial books proliferated after the genocides 
of World War 11. The aftermath of the Nazi mass murders and the disappearance of entire 
communities profoundly redefined the purpose of the yisker biher. Their task became ever 
more doubled: to chronicle the events of destruction and to simultaneously attest to the 
memory and vibrancy of what was. In an important article, Nathan Wachtel describes 
the traditional format of the memorial books as including an introductory historical sec- 
tion on the cultural life of the community in question, followed by individual and group 
accounts - with photographs if they survived - of the times before World War I, the period 
between the two wars and then the genocide.34 Wachtel reminds us that the time periods 
composing these histories often overlap, and their recounting is overlayed with the survivor- 
writers' own diverse and spontaneous memories. Bleeding beyond the historical edges of 
the yisker biher are the grassroots acts by survivors to enliven and re-enact the vibrancy of 
the lives that comprised their communities. 
The Tower of Faces partakes of the yisker biher memorial tradition and its structuring 
of history and memory at the crucial overlappings where the narrative of destruction is 
conveyed so that the telling of the lives that were will live on. Where the memorial books 
accomplish these doubled deeds primarily with words and memoirs, the Tower of Faces 
insists on the pre-war vitality of Ejszyszki with its 1,032 pre-Holocaust photographs. 
That the archive composing these photographs was painstakingly re-assembled by a sur- 
vivor of Ejszyszki reaffirms the Tower of Faces' affinity with the production of the yisker 
biher books. Yaffa Eliach, now Breuklundian Professor of Judaic Studies at Brooklyn 
College, was a young girl when the Einsatzgrzlppen murders occurred. Her parents man- 
aged to escape from the synagogue, fled and were reunited with Yaffa three weeks later 
in another town. After the liberation she returned to Ejszyszki with her family. On 20 
October 1944, the local Polish population staged a pogrom against the surviving 29 Jews, 
killing Yaffa's mother and younger brother. In the face of this double dying, her father paid 
the Polish residents of the town, who had taken over the formerly Jewish-owned homes, 
for the few remaining photographs still housed in these occupied spaces. Over the years, 
Professor Eliach procured still more photographs by contacting fellow survivors who 
emigrated before the Holocaust and by tracking the records of the Ejszyszki Society in 
Chicago. The majority of the 5,000 photographs in her archive, however, were reassem- 
bled by tracing relatives and friends to whom Ejszyskians may have sent copies of photo- 
graphs before 1941. The grave irony of Professor Eliach's recollection process is that her 
grandmother, Alte Katz, was the prominent town photographer before the Einsatzgrzlppen 
murders of 1941 occurred. Her practice was taken over by her non-Jewish competitor. 
None of the negatives from Professor Eliach's grandmother's practice survived. 
Returning to Derrida's reading of Maria Torok's description of the processes of intro- 
jective mourning as 'gradual, slow, laborious, mediated, effective," we see how deeply at 
variance are the workings of the identity card project from those animating the Tower of 
Faces. As an act of remembrance, the Tower of Faces is doubly maintained by Professor 
Eliach's arduous task of re-collection and the deed of love underlying it. Indeed, the labo- 
rious and resiliant archival work occurring here, which is only visible through explication, 
is evoked through the tempered labyrinthian passageway through which the spectator is 
storied. The recurring glass bridge allowing entrance into the broken prism of lives and 
destruction suggests a slow unfolding and a tender yet unswerving approach to the events. 
If the small photographic semblances of persons on the identity cards buffer the museum 
visitor from the horrific while they also allow the accompanying text to do its narrative 
work, the photographs measuring one to three feet which line the Tower of Faces become 
not only performative bridges to representation but also pervade the hauntingly articu- 
lated space. While the identity card faces ask us to assimilate their identities into ours 
through the abbreviated processes of incorporative mourning, the Tower's pressing 
photographic likenesses perform otherness not through a forced notion of sameness, but 
through a startling revelation of difference. That is, on one reading the faces can actually 
be construed as giving something to the viewer rather than asking the viewer to efface the 
subject to be mourned by abridging the acts of mourning. The towering faces mime solace 
and offer oscillating sites of repose. Walter Benjamin's dialectical discussion of the por- 
trait in relationship to the cult of remembrance touches on this double-edged dilemma of 
the power of the photographic face. Writing in 1936 not without some trace of regret, he 
was thinking about the technical reproduction of the human countenance as the last 
retrenchment of photography's cult value: 
It is no accident that the portrait was the focal point of early photography. The cult of remem- 
brance of loved ones, absent or dead, offers a last refuge for the cult value of the picture. For the 
last time the aura emanates from the early photographs in the fleeting expression of a human 
face. This is what constitutes their melancholy, incomparable beauty.35 
The vibrant images in the Tower of Faces do not fulfil1 the cult of remembrance 
through facile refuge or solace. These are not just any anonymous mementoes commemo- 
rating a life's passing through natural or even foreshortened death. They are passing fig- 
ures to the cult of remembrance and even more impressive signals of the severe rupture in 
the notion of a natural death. Their gentle weight cuts between solace and warning. The 
task is not to mime mourning in its abbreviated states, but to compound that act of mim- 
ing mourning immeasurably when the deaths and the losses at issue here surpass the nor- 
mal paradigm of life's worth in death. Unlike the identity card project, which gets caught 
between performing as a history lesson and as a device for mourning, the Tower of Faces' 
similarly doubled obligation acknowledges the riddled (im)possibility of mourning itself. 
Going back to Freud's notion of accomplished mourning, all energy is spent on de-invest- 
ing the libido from the lost one. In "Mourning and Melancolia," Freud discusses the work 
the ego undertakes to be "set free" from the lost one in order for "the loss of the object" to 
be "surmounted."36 While both the workings of the identity card and the Tower of Faces 
involuntarily defy Freud's notion of mastery over the lost one, they do so in very different 
ways. The identity card acknowledges that it can never simulate the long and arduous 
processes of introjective mourning. Rather than giving up the lost loved one or the "object" 
as Freud's model suggests, the identity card project seeks its mock-adoption. The Tower 
of Faces, however, sets up a soft barrier between the taking in of an analogized self and 
keeps its distance from the trespass of sites of deaths and identities that never had the lux- 
ury of being fixed. It rejects the Freudian assumption that the memory and pain of losing 
the lost one, and in this case, the lost many, can be surmounted and mastered. Rather than 
miming the dual processes of mourning and drawing the viewer in through crucial yet 
overtly artificial identifications with the lost or traumatized Holocaust other as in the 
identity card project, the dynamics between museum visitor and the mourned other in the 
Tower of Faces are at once more modest and more far-reaching. Specifically in relation 
to the cutting employment of nostalgia in the portraits reproduced in the Tower of Faces, 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas' difficult formulations of facing, otherness and alterity 
come into focus: 
This incommensurability with consciousness, which becomes a trace of the one who knows 
where, is not the inoffensive relationship of a knowledge in which everything is equalised, not 
the indifference of spatial contiguity; it is an assimilation of me by another, a responsibility with 
regard to men we do not even know. The relationship of proximity cannot be reduced to any 
modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, not to the simple "representation" of a neigh- 
bour; it is already an assignation - an obligation, anachronistically prior to any commitment.37 
In Levinas' perspective it is not only the dialectic of the other being assimilated into 
the subject that is at  stake. His thinking on alterity emphasizes the demand the other 
holds on the subject in opening up that fragile, tense and impalpable space between self 
and other. Akin to Levinas' notion of alterity, the Tower of Faces does not ask the subject 
to recognize the other through the kind of blind and frontal acknowledgement upon which 
some documentary photography represents the other in order to involuntarily dismiss him 
or her. The hovering photographs in the Tower of Faces challenge the viewer's sense of 
precarious involvement in the terror and stage the entire apparatus to perform more as a 
fluctuating memorial rather than as a stable and self-assured monument. 
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